An analytic-critical look at G. E. Moore's views of the relation between "Intuition" and justifying moral judgments

In this paper, I have tried to answer, by an analytic-critical method, to this question: What is the relation between moral intuition and justifying moral judgments from Moore's viewpoint? For answering to this question, by distinguishing the two meanings of "Intuition" in Moore's views, namely "Immediate and direct perception of the property 'Goodness'" and "Immediate and direct perception of the propositions containing the predicate 'Good'" - which I have called them Intuition (1) and Intuition (2) - I have shown that, according to Moore, intuition can justify moral judgments, based on the traditional definition of "knowledge". At the end of my discussion of the relation between each of the two meanings of intuition and justifying moral judgments, I have criticized Moore's views. Following are what I finally get: a) Intuition (1) implies "emotive evaluation"; b) Intuition (1) doesn't provide any criterion for resolving the basic moral disagreements; c) Intuition (1) can't produce any knowledge; d) Since Moore's claim that "the propositions containing the predicate 'Good' are 'correspondent to reality' and 'factual'", it is unreasoned. Intuition (2) can't justify moral judgments; e) since intuition (2) doesn't provide any appropriate reason for believing in the self-evidence and necessary truth of such propositions, it can't justify moral judgment